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Abstract. Non-malleability is an important security property for public-
key encryption (PKE). Its significance is due to the fundamental un-
achievability of integrity and authenticity guarantees in this setting, ren-
dering it the strongest integrity-like property achievable using only PKE,
without digital signatures. In this work, we generalize this notion to
the setting of quantum public-key encryption. Overcoming the notorious
“recording barrier” known from generalizing other integrity-like security
notions to quantum encryption, we generalize one of the equivalent clas-
sical definitions, comparison-based non-malleability, and show how it can
be fulfilled. In addition, we explore one-time non-malleability notions for
symmetric-key encryption from the literature by defining plaintext and
ciphertext variants and by characterizing their relation.
1 Introduction
The development of quantum information processing technology has accelerated
recently, with many large public and private players investing heavily [Wal18].
A future where communication networks include at least some high-capacity
quantum channels and fault-tolerant quantum computers seems therefore more
and more likely. How will we secure communication over the resulting “quantum
internet” [WEH18]? One approach is to rely on features inherent to quantum
theory to get unconditional security, e.g. by using teleportation. Such methods
are, however, a far cry from the classical standard internet cryptography in terms
of efficiency, as they require interaction. A different and more efficient approach
is to generalize modern private- and public-key cryptography to the quantum
realm.
In this paper, we focus on the notion of non-malleability, which captures
the idea that an encrypted message cannot be altered by a third party in a
structured manner. This notion, first introduced by Dolev, Dwork and Naor
[DDN03], derives its importance from the fact that it is the strongest integrity-
like notion that is achievable using public-key encryption only. The aim of this
work is to generalize this notion to public-key encryption of quantum data. A
recent attack that exemplifies the relevance of the concept of non-malleability is
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the “efail”-attack on the PGP protocol for confidential and authenticated e-mail
communication [Pod+18]. This kind of attack, where an attacker is not directly
able to learn the message yet still able to modify it, is exactly what non-malleable
encryption secures against.
The classical notion of non-malleability is based on the notion of related
plaintexts. For a non-malleable encryption scheme, it should, roughly speaking,
be hard for an adversary to transform an encryption of a message m into a differ-
ent ciphertext that decrypts to a related message m′. Here, “related” just means
that the adversary has some control over the transformation that is applied to
the plaintext underlying the ciphertext he attacks. Generalizing this notion to
the quantum case is complicated by the quantum no-cloning theorem: After a
message has been encrypted and modified by the adversary and subsequently
decrypted, it cannot be compared with the result anymore. In addition, it can-
not be checked in a straightforward manner whether the adversary has indeed
modified the ciphertext.
In this work, we overcome these obstacles. The key ideas are the following.
In the classical security game, an adversary is first asked to submit a distribu-
tion from which a plaintext is sampled. In the quantum setting, any message
sampling procedure can be implemented by first performing a unitary quantum
computation, and then discarding the contents of an auxiliary register. Instead
of discarding this register, we view it as an extra record that is created along
with the message. This extra record is then used instead of the original plaintext
for evaluating the quantum analog of a relation. The test whether the adversary
has indeed modified the ciphertext is performed by running the sampling- and
encryption computations backwards on the attacked ciphertext. If the ciphertext
was not modified, this returns the registers into their initial blank state, which
can be detected.
We establish confidence in the new security notion by showing that it becomes
equivalent to the classical notion when restricted to the post-quantum setting,
i.e. to classical PKE schemes and classical plaintexts and ciphertexts. We also
show how to satisfy the new security notion using a classical-quantum hybrid
construction.
Along the way, we chart the landscape of one-time non-malleability notions
for symmetric-key quantum encryption. We propose definitions for plaintext and
ciphertext non-malleability and explore their relationship with existing defini-
tions. In particular, we present evidence that these notions are the right ones.
1.1 Related Work
Non-malleability has been studied extensively in the classical setting, see [BS99;
PV06] and references therein. In quantum cryptography, non-malleability has
been, to our knowledge, subject of only two earlier works [ABW09; AM17], which
were only concerned with one-time security for symmetric-key encryption.
Quantum public-key encryption has been studied in [BJ15; Ala+16] with
respect to confidentiality.
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Problems due to quantum no-cloning and the destructive nature of quantum
measurement similar to the ones we face in this work have arisen before in the
literature. In particular, devising security notions for quantum encryption where
the classical security definition requires copying and comparing plaintexts or ci-
phertexts [AGM18b; AGM18a], as well as in some quantum attack models for
classical cryptography [BZ13a; BZ13b; Ala+18] requires tackling similar obsta-
cles. Another important case where the generalization of classical techniques is
complicated by the mentioned features of quantum theory is that of rewinding
and reprogramming [Unr12; Wat18; Don+19].
1.2 Summary of Contributions
The contributions presented in this paper can be divided into two categories,
depending on whether they concern symmetric-key encryption (SKE) or public-
key encryption (PKE). While we consider our results of the latter kind our main
contribution, they build upon the former results. We therefore begin by present-
ing our results on one-time non-malleability of quantum SKE in Section 3, after
which we continue with the results on many-time non-malleability for quantum
PKE in Section 4.
Symmetric-Key Non-Malleability All security notions that are concerned
with malleability attacks come in two flavors, a plaintext and a ciphertext one.
The difference is that in the former, an attack that modifies a ciphertext into a
different one that decrypts to the same plaintext is considered harmless, while
the latter considers any modification a successful attack. We refine the non-
malleability notion NM introduced in [AM17], to obtain a definition for both ci-
phertext and plaintext non-malleability, while staying in the effective-map based
framework. The effective map resulting from a one-time malleability attack is the
map on the plaintext space, that is implemented by the procedure of encrypting
the input, applying the attack and subsequently decrypting the result again.
Definition 1.1 (PNM and CiNM, informal). A scheme is plaintext non-
malleable, (PNM)), if for any attack Λ the effective map Λ˜ consists of replacing
the plaintext with a random decryption with some probability p, and leaving it
unchanged otherwise. If the probability p is equal to the probability that Λ acts as
the identity on a random ciphertext, it is even ciphertext non-malleable (CiNM)).
There is one important subtlety that we would like to highlight here. The
notion NM from [AM17] is very similar to CiNM. The only difference is that in
the former, p is derived from the probability that Λ acts as identity on a random
element of the ciphertext space, including ciphertexts that are not even valid.
For CiNM, on the other hand, p is the probability that Λ acts as identity on a
ciphertext that is generated by picking a random plaintext and then encrypting
it.
We continue by exploring the relationship between NM, CiNM, and PNM. In
particular, we present separating examples between NM and CiNM, NM and
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PNM, and CiNM and PNM, and show that both notions of ciphertext non-
malleability, NM and CiNM, imply plaintext non-malleability,
Theorem 1.2 (3.5). Any ε-NM or ε-CiNM SKQES is ε-PNM.
Additionally, we give a simplifying characterization of PNM that allows for ef-
ficient simulation following [BW16]. We also show that for encryption schemes
with unitary encryption map4, all three notions are equivalent.
Theorem 1.3 (3.8, informal). For symmetric-key encryption schemes with
unitary encryption map, PNM, CiNM, and NM are equivalent.
Finally, we show that one can construct a quantum authentication scheme
according to the security definition from [DNS12] from a PNM scheme (and
therefore, by Theorem 1.2, also from a CiNM scheme). This is done by adding
a tag to the plaintext during encryption, which is checked during decryption, as
proposed for NM schemes in [AM17].
Theorem 1.4 (3.10). From any PNM scheme, one can construct a 22−r-DNS-
authenticating scheme using r tag qubits.
Public-Key Non-Malleability We propose a definition for public-key quan-
tum non-malleability in a computational setting, by adapting the classical def-
inition for comparison-based non-malleability found in [BS99], a real-vs-ideal
definition. In the following, we describe informally what main challenges the
generalization of the classical security experiments (the real and the ideal one)
to the quantum setting poses, and how we resolved them.
In the first step in the classical security experiments, the adversary submits a
probability distribution p over messages. In both experiments, a plaintext from
this distribution is sampled, encrypted and sent to the adversary. The adversary
now has the opportunity to manipulate (or “malleate”) the ciphertext with the
goal that the output decrypts to a related plaintext.5 The relation according to
which the plaintexts are related, is supplied by the adversary. Of course there are
examples of relations that allow for easy creation of a ciphertext that decrypts
to a related plaintext, like e.g. the trivial relation where any plaintext is related
to any other plaintext. To not credit an adversary with a break for fulfilling such
a relation, her success in two experiments is compared: in the real world, the
relation is evaluated on the initial and final plaintexts, but in the ideal world, it
is evaluated on the final plaintext and a plaintext that is independently sampled
from p.
Attempting a naive quantum generalization, we face two main challenges:
How does the challenger ensure that the ciphertext he received from the ad-
versary is actually modified? And how does he evaluate a relation on the input
4 More precisely, the encryption with a fixed key is unitary.
5 In the actual experiments, the adversary is allowed to transform the ciphertext into
many attempted manipulated ciphertexts. In this informal description we simplify
as no significant additional technical challenges arise from the generalization.
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plaintext and the decrypted one? Both questions are complicated by the fact that
quantum information cannot be copied. The first question has a rather elegant
solution. Instead of asking the adversary to provide a distribution of messages,
we ask her to provide a state preparation circuit, a strict generalization of the
former. Such a state preparation circuit starts from a blank register and prepares
a quantum state on the plaintext register and an auxiliary register. But quan-
tum operations are reversible, which means that to test whether the plaintext
has changed after encryption, attack and decryption,6 we can run preparation
backwards and measure whether we got back a blank register. If so, the cipher-
text was not changed, and the candidate manipulated plaintext is discarded. If
not, we run preparation forward again, recovering (the actually changed part of)
the adversary’s candidate malleation.
The second question is solved by exploiting the fact that in the quantum
setting, any message-sampling procedure can be implemented by first performing
a unitary quantum computation, and then discarding the contents of an auxiliary
register. We can therefore ask the adversary to provide a state-sampling unitary
and store the auxiliary register as a record indicating which plaintext has been
created. After proceeding with the experiment as in the classical case and using
the modification test as described above, instead of checking whether the original
and the attacked plaintext are related, we can now, in the real world case, check
whether the attacked plaintext is related to the record. In the ideal world, the
record is replaced with an independently created one.
Definition 1.5 (QCNM, informal). A scheme is quantum comparison-based
non-malleable (QCNM) if no adversary can achieve a better than negligible ad-
vantage in distinguishing the real and ideal versions of the quantum comparison-
based non-malleability experiment described above.
We go on to show that QCNM is a consistent generalization of CNM.
Theorem 1.6 (4.4, informal). When restricted to the post-quantum setting,
QCNM and CNM are equivalent.
Finally, we show that a QCNM scheme can be constructed from a CiNM
scheme. The quantum-classical hybrid construction, which was extensively stud-
ied in [AGM18a] with respect to confidentiality and integrity, is obtained by en-
crypting every plaintext with a symmetric-key, one-time secure quantum encryp-
tion scheme and a fresh key, and then encrypting that key with a non-malleable
classical public-key encryption scheme and appending it to the ciphertext.
Theorem 1.7 (4.6, informal). Using a CNM classical scheme and a CiNM
quantum scheme it is possible to construct a QCNM scheme via quantum-classical
hybrid encryption.
6 Here we have to undo encryption in a different way as decryption is an irreversible
process in general, see Section 4 for details.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the notation and conventions used and provide
a very brief overview of background material. For a more general overview of
quantum computing see, for example, [Wat18].
2.1 Conventions and Notation
The adjoint of a complex matrix M is denoted by M† and its trace as Tr [M ]. All
Hilbert spaces HA in this work have dimension |A| := dim(HA) = 2m for some
m ∈ N. For Hilbert spaces HA, and HB , we write 1A for the identity matrix
on HA, or 1 if the space is clear from context, and 0A→B or 0A for the all-zero
matrix of dimension |A| × |B| or |A| × |A| respectively. We denote the set of
square matrices that act on HA as B(HA). We call a function ε(n) negligible
(denoted ε ≤ negl(n)) if for every polynomial p there exists n0 ∈ N such that for
all n ≥ n0 it holds that ε(n) < 1p(n) . Furthermore we use log(x) to denote the
base-2 logarithm of x.
2.2 Quantum States and Operations
We use bra-ket notation to denote a norm-1 vector |φ〉 ∈ HA, sometimes denoted
|φ〉A for clarity. The set {|x〉A | x ∈ {0, 1}n} forms a basis of HA with |A| = 2n,
which is called the computational basis. Quantum states are described by density
matrices, which are positive semi-definite Hermitian matrices with trace 1. The
set of density matrices on HA is denoted by D(HA). The maximally mixed state
is defined as τA = 1|A| . Furthermore we use φ
+AA′ = |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ to denote the
(standard) maximally entangled state, where |φ+〉AA′ = 1√|A|
∑
x∈{0,1}log(|A|)
|xx〉.
A quantum state can be stored in a quantum register, which can be thought
of as the quantum equivalent of a variable. A register A can store a density
matrix ρ ∈ D(HA). In a cryptographic setting a “register” A is often an infinite
family of registers, one for each value of the security parameter. The action of
a quantum algorithm can be described as a completely positive trace-preserving
(CPTP) map (a quantum channel). Sometimes the trace preserving property
is relaxed to trace non-increasing, in which case we call it a CPTNI-map. If a
quantum algorithm has a classical argument then it is understood that this argu-
ment is converted to the computational basis and classical outputs are obtained
by measuring in the computational basis. We write ΛA→B to mean a CPTP
map from register A to register B. When a quantum channel ΛA→B is evalu-
ated on a state ρAC , then it implicitly acts as identity on register C, meaning
ΛA→B(ρAC) = (ΛA→B ⊗ idC)(ρAC). To quantify the difference between quan-
tum channels we will use the diamond norm, or completely bounded trace norm,
defined as∥∥LA→B∥∥ = max
ρAA′
∥∥∥(L⊗ idA′)(ρ)∥∥∥
1
,
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where A′ is a copy of the A register and ‖M‖1 = Tr
[√
M†M
]
. For a quan-
tum state σ, we define the CPTP map 〈σ〉(·) = σTr(·), i.e. 〈σ〉 is the constant
quantum channel that maps every input state to σ.
We write y ← A(x1, . . . , xn) to mean that y is the result of running an
algorithm A on inputs x1, . . . , xn, and similarly Y ← A(X1, . . . , Xn) to mean
that register Y holds the state resulting from running the quantum algorithm A
on input registers X1, . . . , Xn. We write PPT to denote a uniform polynomial-
time family of classical circuits and QPT to denote a uniform polynomial-time
family of quantum circuits.
2.3 (Quantum) Encryption Schemes
We follow the conventions used in [AGM18b], in particular we use Enck =
Enc(k, ·) and Deck = Dec(k, ·). We begin by defining symmetric-key and public-
key quantum encryption schemes.
Definition 2.1. A symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme (SKQES) is a
triple (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), where
– KeyGen is a PPT algorithm that given a security parameter n ∈ N outputs
a key k,
– Enc is a QPT algorithm which takes as input a classical key k and a quantum
state in register M and outputs a quantum state in register C,
– Dec is a QPT algorithm which takes as input a classical key k and a quantum
state in register C and outputs a quantum state in register M or |⊥〉〈⊥|⊥,
such that
∥∥∥Deck ◦ Enck − idM→M⊕⊥∥∥∥ ≤ negl(n) for all k ← KeyGen(1n).
Definition 2.2. A public-key quantum encryption scheme (PKQES) is a triple
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec), where
– KeyGen is a PPT algorithm that given a security parameter n ∈ N outputs
a pair of keys (pk, sk),
– Enc is a QPT algorithm which takes as input a classical public key pk and a
quantum state in register M and outputs a quantum state in register C,
– Dec is a QPT algorithm which takes as input a classical secret key sk and
a quantum state in register C and outputs a quantum state in register M or
|⊥〉〈⊥|⊥,
s.t.
∥∥∥Decsk ◦ Encpk − idM→M⊕⊥∥∥∥ ≤ negl(n) for all (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n).
It is implicit that |M | ≤ |C| ≤ 2q(n) for some polynomial q. Furthermore
we only consider fixed-length schemes, which means |M | is a fixed function of n.
Lastly we adopt the convention that every honest party applies the measurement
{|⊥〉〈⊥|,1 − |⊥〉〈⊥|} after running Dec, and denote with Deck(C) 6= ⊥ the
event that this measurement did not measure |⊥〉〈⊥| and thus produced a valid
plaintext. Because of this convention we often state that the output space of Dec
is D(HM ) although it is technically D(HM ⊕H⊥), where H⊥ = C|⊥〉.
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Theorem 2.3 (Lemma 1 in [AGM18a]).
Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a SKQES, then Enc and Dec have the following
form, for all k ← KeyGen:∥∥∥Enck − Vk((·)M ⊗ σTk )V †k ∥∥∥ ≤ ε∥∥∥Deck(VkPTσk(V †k (·)CVk)PTσkV †k )− TrT [PTσk(V †k (·)CVk)PTσk]∥∥∥ ≤ ε.
Here σk is a state on register T , Vk is a unitary ε ≤ negl(n). Furthermore, Pσk
is an orthogonal projectors such that ‖PσkσkPσk − σk‖ ≤ ε and P¯σk = 1−Pσk .
Furthermore, for every k there exists a probability distribution pk and a family
of quantum states |ψk,r〉T such that Enck is ε-close to the following algorithm:
1. sample r
pk←− {0, 1}log |T |;
2. apply the map Enck;r(X
M ) = Vk(X
M ⊗ ψTk,r)V †k .
In this paper we will only consider schemes where all the actions described
in Theorem 2.3 can be implemented by a PPT or QPT algorithm.
2.4 Security Definitions
In this paper we will build upon the classical definitions of non-malleability
[BS99] and the existing quantum definitions of non-malleability [ABW09; AM17].
Experiment 1: CNM-Real
Input : Π,A, n
Output: b ∈ {0, 1}
1 (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n)
2 (M, s)← A1(pk)
3 x←M
4 y ← Encpk(x)
5 (R,y)← A2(s, y)
6 x← Decsk(y)
7 Output 1 iff (y 6∈ y) ∧R(x,x)
Experiment 2: CNM-Ideal
Input : Π,A, n
Output: b ∈ {0, 1}
1 (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n)
2 (M, s)← A1(pk)
3 x, x˜←M
4 y˜ ← Encpk(x˜)
5 (R, y˜)← A2(s, y˜)
6 x˜← Decsk(y˜)
7 Output 1 iff (y˜ 6∈ y˜) ∧R(x, x˜)
Definition 2.4 (Definition 2 in [BS99] (CNM-CPA)). A PKES Π is com-
parison-based non-malleable for chosen-plaintext attacks (CNM) if for any ad-
versary A = (A1,A2) it holds that
Pr [CNM-Real(Π,A, n) = 1]− Pr [CNM-Ideal(Π,A, n) = 1] ≤ negl(n),
if A is such that:
– A1 and A2 are PPT
– A1 outputs a valid message space M which can be sampled by a PPT algo-
rithm
– A2 outputs a relation R computable by a PPT algorithm
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– A2 outputs a vector y such that ⊥ 6∈ Decsk(y)
For comparison-based non-malleability, we consider adversaries that are split
into two stages, where each stage is a probabilistic algorithm. The first stage
takes as input the public key and produces a message distribution, which is (a
description of) a probabilistic algorithm that produces a plaintext. The second
stage takes as input one ciphertext of a plaintext produced by this algorithm and
produces a vector of ciphertexts and a relation R. The goal of the adversary is to
construct R in such a way that R holds between the original plaintext and the
(element-wise) decryption of the produced ciphertext vector, but not between
another plaintext which is sampled independently from the message distribution
and the decryption of this same vector. If an adversary can achieve this relation
to hold with non-negligible probability, then intuitively the adversary was able to
structurally change an encrypted message, which would indicate that the scheme
is malleable.
In the existing literature on non-malleability in the quantum setting, the
approach taken is quite different from the notion described above. Here, the
focus is put on unconditional one-time security notions of symmetric-key non-
malleability and authentication. In this setting, a notion of non-malleability was
first introduced in [ABW09], which defines non-malleability as a condition on
the effective map of an arbitrary attack. The effective map of an attack ΛCB→CBˆA
is defined as Λ˜MB→MBˆA = E
k←KeyGen(1n)
Deck ◦ ΛA ◦ Enck, and can be thought of
as the average effect of an attack on the plaintext level.
The main idea of this definition is that a ciphertext cannot be meaningfully
transformed into the ciphertext of another message, which means that the effec-
tive map of any attack is either identity, in case no transformation is applied, or
a 〈ρ〉 map, when the ciphertext is fully destroyed and replaced by another. Note
that this way of defining non-malleability can also be satisfied by a scheme which
has the property that an attacker can transform a ciphertext into another cipher-
text of the same message. In other words, the non-malleability is only enforced
on the plaintext level, which means it is a form of plaintext non-malleability. The
classical notions discussed in the previous section do not allow for attacks that
map an encrypted message to a different encryption of the same message. This
restriction means non-malleability is enforced on the ciphertext level and thus
these classical notions define forms of ciphertext non-malleability.
This effective-map-based way of describing non-malleability was continued
in [AM17], where an insufficiency of the previous definition was demonstrated
and a new definition was given. Their definition is given in terms of the mutual
information between the plaintext and the side-information collected by the at-
tacker. However, one of the results in their paper is a characterization theorem
which we consider as the definition instead.
Definition 2.5 (Theorem 4.4 in [AM17]). A SKQES (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is
ε-non-malleable (ε-NM) if, for any attack ΛCB→CBˆA , its effective map
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Λ˜MB→MBˆA is such that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε,
where
Λ1 = TrCC′
[
φ+CC
′
ΛA(φ
+CC′ ⊗ (·))
]
and
Λ2 = TrCC′
[
(1CC
′ − φ+CC′)ΛA(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·))
]
.
A SKQES is non-malleable (NM) if it is ε-NM for some ε ≤ negl(n).
In the symmetric-key setting, one can also consider the notion of authen-
tication. A scheme satisfying this notion not only prevents an attacker from
meaningfully transforming ciphertexts, but any attempt to do so can also be
detected by the receiving party. In [DNS12] a definition is given for this notion,
which we adapt slightly to use the diamond norm instead of the trace norm.
Definition 2.6 (Definition 2.2 in [DNS12]). A SKQES Π is ε-DNS authen-
ticating (ε-DNS) if, for any attack ΛCB→CBˆA , its effective map Λ˜
MB→MBˆ
A is such
that∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆacc + 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ ΛB→Bˆrej )∥∥∥ ≤ ε,
for some CPTNI maps Λacc, Λrej such that Λacc + Λrej is CPTP. A SKQES
Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is DNS authenticating (DNS) if it is ε−DNS for some
ε ≤ negl(n).
It is shown in [AM17] that a NM scheme can be modified to a scheme that
is DNS authenticating by appending a tag to the encoded plaintext.
3 Non-Malleability for Quantum SKE
While Definition 2.5 of NM presented in [AM17] has many desirable features, it
turns out that it is slightly too strong in the sense that it rules out schemes that
are clearly non-malleable intuitively. Furthermore, it has not been discussed in
[AM17] whether NM actually ensures non-malleability of ciphertexts, or merely
plaintext non-malleability. In this section, we will discuss these features of NM
in detail. Furthermore, we propose a plaintext and a ciphertext version of NM,
shedding light on how these different security properties are expressed in the
effective-map formalism.
3.1 Ciphertext Non-Malleability
When inspecting the Definition 2.5 of NM, one can observe that the constraints
on Λ1 and Λ2 make NM a type of ciphertext non-malleability: Unless the ad-
versary applies the identity channel, we end up in the case of Λ2. However, the
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use of φ+ in defining these constraints can be considered problematic when the
ciphertext space is not uniformly used, i.e. when EncK(τ
M ) 6= τC . We provide
an example of how this could be problematic.
Example 3.1. Let Π ′ = (KeyGen,Enc′,Dec′) be an NM SKQES, with cipher-
text space HC′ . Let HC = HC′ ⊗ HT , where HT = C2, then define Π =
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) as follows, with ciphertext space HC :
– Enck(X) = Enc
′
k(X)⊗ |0〉〈0|T
– Deck(Y ) = Dec
′
k(TrT
[|0〉〈0|TY ]) + Tr [|1〉〈1|TY ] |⊥〉〈⊥|
Consider the attack Λ(ψC) = |0〉〈0|Tψ|0〉〈0|T + 〈τ〉C′(|1〉〈1|Tψ|1〉〈1|T ) (with
trivial register B), which is the attack of measuring the T register in the com-
putational basis and replacing the C ′ register with the maximally mixed state
if the outcome of this measurement is 1 and doing nothing otherwise. As the
register B is trivial, Λ1 is just a probability. We calculate
Λ1 = Tr
[
φ+CCΛ(φ+CC)
]
= Tr
[
φ+CC(
1
2
|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ φ+C′C′ + 1
2
|1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1| ⊗ τC′ ⊗ τC′)
]
=
|C ′|2 + 1
4|C ′|2 .
However the effective map is Λ˜ = id, which shows that Π is not NM.
What could be considered problematic about this example is that any attack
on Π is also an attack on Π ′, since the attacker could add and remove the
T register himself. Furthermore, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
ciphertexts of Π and ciphertexts of Π ′, because the T register is checked during
decryption. This means that if an attacker could perform a malleability attack
on Π, i.e. constructively transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext, then the
attack obtained by applying the above strategy would be a malleability attack
on Π ′. Thus one could argue that, intuitively, non-malleability of Π ′ should
imply non-malleability of Π. We suggest the following improved definition that
prevents this behavior.
Definition 3.2. A SKQES (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is ε-ciphertext non-malleable (ε-
CiNM) if, for any attack ΛCB→CBˆA , its effective map Λ˜
MB→MBˆ
A is such that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε,
where
Λ1 = E
k,r
[
TrCM ′
[
ψCM
′
k,r ΛA(ψ
CM ′
k,r ⊗ (·))
]]
and
Λ2 = E
k,r
[
TrCM ′
[
(1CM
′ − ψCM ′k,r )ΛA(ψCM
′
k,r ⊗ (·))
]]
.
Here Enck;r is as in Theorem 2.3, Ek,r is taken uniformly over k and with r
sampled according to pk from Theorem 2.3, and ψ
CM ′
k,r = Enck;r(φ
+MM ′). A
SKQES is ciphertext non-malleable (CiNM) if it is ε-CiNM for some ε ≤ negl(n).
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3.2 Plaintext Non-Malleability
For ciphertext non-malleability, discussed in the last section, the effective map
approach seems slightly ill-suited: after all, the effective map is a map on plain-
texts! What makes CiNM (and NM, albeit in an overzealous way) definitions of
ciphertext non-malleability are the constraints placed on the map which Λ˜A is
compared with (the simulator). These constraints are imposed by the definitions
of Λ1 and Λ2 and connect the simulator, which acts on plaintexts, to the attack
map, which acts on ciphertexts.In order to construct a definition for plaintext
non-malleability from NM, we therefore drop these constraints. In addition, we
change the |C|2 constant for the constant |M |2, as the former constant is a di-
rect artifact of the constraints. In other words, plaintext-non-malleability “does
not know about ciphertexts”, i.e., in particular, the ciphertext space dimension
should be immaterial. We would like to remark that the latter point does not
matter when talking about approximate non-malleability in the asymptotic set-
ting, where the plaintext space grows polynomially with the security parameter.
The above considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 3.3. A SKQES (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is ε-plaintext non-malleable (ε-
PNM) if, for any attack ΛCB→CBˆA , its effective map Λ˜
MB→MBˆ
A is such that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|M |2 − 1 (|M |2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε,
where Λ1 and Λ2 are CPTNI and Λ1 + Λ2 is CPTP. A SKQES is plaintext non-
malleable (PNM) if it is ε− PNM for some ε ≤ negl(n).
Intuitively, ciphertext non-malleability is a strictly stronger security notion
than plaintext non-malleability since the latter is obtained from the former by
dropping the constraints on the simulator. This intuition holds true for our
proposed PNM definition.
Lemma 3.4. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an arbitrary SKQES and ΛCB→CBˆA
an arbitrary attack on Π with effective map Λ˜MB→MBˆA . If there exist CPTNI
Λ1, Λ2, such that Λ1 + Λ2 is CPTP and it holds that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε,
then for any α such that |M |2 ≤ α ≤ |C|2 there exist CPTNI Λ3, Λ4 such that
Λ3 + Λ4 is CPTP and∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ3 + 1α− 1 (α〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ4
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
Proof. For fixed Λ1 and Λ2 one can obtain the statement by defining
Λ3 = Λ1 +
(
1− (α− 1)|C|
2
α(|C|2 − 1)
)
Λ2 and
Λ4 =
(α− 1)|C|2
α(|C|2 − 1)Λ2.
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The full proof of this lemma is rather technical and can be found in Appendix
A.1. uunionsq
Lemma 3.4 shows that the |C|2 constant present in the NM definition can
be decreased down to |M |2, obtaining increasingly weaker security notions. This
fact immediately implies the following
Theorem 3.5. Any ε-NM or ε-CiNM SKQES is ε-PNM.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.4 with α = |M |2. uunionsq
While PNM does not explicitly restrict the choice of Λ1 and Λ2, an explicit
form for Λi can be required without significantly strengthening the definition in
the sense that the additional requirement only decreases security by at most a
factor of 3.
Theorem 3.6. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an arbitrary ε-PNM SKQES for
some ε, then for any attack ΛCB→CBˆA , its effective map Λ˜
MB→MBˆ
A is such that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|M |2 − 1 (|M |2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ 3ε,
where
Λ1 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
Λ˜A(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
and
Λ2 = TrMM ′
[
(1MM
′ − φ+MM ′)Λ˜A(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
.
Proof. We sketch the proof here, the full proof of this theorem can be found in
Appendix A.2. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an arbitrary ε-PNM SKQES for
some ε and let ΛCB→CBˆA be an arbitrary attack with effective map Λ˜
MB→MBˆ
A .
Furthermore, let ΛB→Bˆ1 and Λ
B→Bˆ
2 be such that
∥∥∥Λ˜A − Λ˜ideal∥∥∥ ≤ ε, where
Λ˜MB→MBˆideal = id
M ⊗Λ1 + 1|M |2−1 (|M |2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ2. Lastly, let
Λ3 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
Λ˜A(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
,
Λ4 = TrMM ′
[
(1MM
′ − φ+MM ′)Λ˜A(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
,
Λ˜MB→MBˆtrace = id
M ⊗Λ3 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |
2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ4,
Λ5 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
Λ˜ideal(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
, and
Λ6 = TrMM ′
[
(1MM
′ − φ+MM ′)Λ˜ideal(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
Observe that
∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − Λ˜trace∥∥∥ ≤ ‖(Λ1 − Λ3)‖ + ‖(Λ2 − Λ4)‖. Since∥∥∥(Λ˜− Λ˜ideal)(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Λ˜− Λ˜ideal∥∥∥ ≤ ε, we have ‖Λ3 − Λ5‖ ≤ ε
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and ‖Λ4 − Λ6‖ ≤ ε. Using this we observe that∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − Λ˜trace∥∥∥ ≤ ‖Λ1 − Λ3‖ + ‖Λ2 − Λ4‖
≤ ‖Λ1 − Λ5‖ + ‖Λ5 − Λ3‖ + ‖Λ2 − Λ6‖ + ‖Λ6 − Λ4‖
≤ 2ε+ ‖Λ1 − Λ5‖ + ‖Λ2 − Λ6‖ .
By substituting the definition of Λ˜ideal we observe that Λ5 = Λ1 and Λ6 = Λ2.
From this we conclude∥∥∥Λ˜− Λ˜trace∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Λ˜− Λ˜ideal∥∥∥ + ∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − Λ˜trace∥∥∥
≤ 3ε.
uunionsq
Theorem 3.7. There exists a PKQES Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) that is PNM but
not NM and not CiNM.
Proof. Let Π ′ = (KeyGen′,Enc′,Dec′) be an arbitrary PKQES that is NM7. Then
define Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) as
KeyGen = KeyGen′
Enck = Enc
′
k ⊗ |0〉〈0|R
Deck = Dec
′
k ◦ TrR,
where R is an auxiliary 1-qubit register. Let Λ be an arbitrary attack on Π with
effective map Λ˜, then define Λ′ = TrR
[
Λ((·)⊗ |0〉〈0|R)], which is an attack on
Π ′ with effective map Λ˜′. Observe that Λ˜′ = Λ˜, since the R register is only added
and then traced out. Because Π ′ is NM, we have ΛB→Bˆ3 and Λ
B→Bˆ
4 such that∥∥∥∥Λ˜′ − idM ⊗Λ3 + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ4
∥∥∥∥

≤ negl(n)
It follows from Lemma 3.4 that Π is PNM.
Now consider the attack ΛX = id
C ⊗(X(·)X)R⊗Tr[·]B , where X is the Pauli
X gate, with X|0〉 = |1〉 and X|1〉 = |0〉. Let f(x1 . . . xn) = x1 . . . xn−1(1− xn),
i.e. the result of flipping the last bit of some bitstring. Observe that
ΛX(φ
+CC′ ⊗ (·)B) = (id⊗(X(·)X)R ⊗ Tr[·]B)
∑
i,j
|ii〉〈jj|CC′ ⊗ (·)B

= Tr [·]B
∑
i,j
|f(i)i〉〈f(j)j|.
7 See [AM17] for such a scheme.
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Since this superposition contains no components of the form |xx〉〈xx|CC′ and
φ+CC
′
only contains components of this form, we have that φ+CC
′
ΛX(φ
+CC′ ⊗
(·)B) = 0BCC′→CC′ . With ψCM ′k,r = Enck;r(φ+MM
′
) = |0〉〈0| ⊗ Enc′k;r(φ+MM
′
),
we have ψCM
′
k,r ΛX(ψ
CM ′
k,r ⊗ (·)B) = 0BCC
′→CC′ .
Also note that the effective map of ΛX is Λ˜X = id
M ⊗Tr[·]B , since the attack
only acts on R and B and thus does not modify the message in M . Let Λ1 and
Λ2 be as in Definition 2.5 or as in Definition 3.2, then Tr [Λ1(ρ)] = 0 for all ρ. It
follows that Λ2 = TrCC′
[
(1− φ+CC′)ΛX(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·)B)
]
= Tr[·]B . Furthermore
we have∥∥∥∥Λ˜X − (idM ⊗Λ1 + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ2
)∥∥∥∥

=
∥∥∥∥(idM ⊗Tr[·]B)− ( 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ Tr[·]B
)∥∥∥∥

=
∥∥∥∥idM − 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)M
∥∥∥∥

≥
∥∥∥∥φ+MM ′ − 1|C|2 − 1(|C|2DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′ − φ+MM ′)
∥∥∥∥
1
=2 max
0≤P≤1
Tr
[
P (φ+MM
′ − 1|C|2 − 1(|C|
2DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′ − φ+MM ′))
]
≥2 Tr
[
φ+MM
′
(φ+MM
′ − 1|C|2 − 1(|C|
2DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′ − φ+MM ′))
]
=2− 2(|C|
2 − |M |2)
|M |2(|C|2 − 1) > 1,
where we use that Tr
[
φ+MM
′
(DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′)
]
= 1|M |2 , as is proven in the
proof of Theorem A.2, and |M | ≥ 2, which is true when we assume that we are
encrypting at least one qubit. This shows that Π is not NM and not CiNM. uunionsq
While the above shows that PNM and CiNM are not the same in general,
a special case arises when each plaintext has exactly one ciphertext (per key).
Recall that plaintext non-malleability relaxes the constraints of ciphertext non-
malleability by allowing the adversary to implement an attack that transforms
one ciphertext into another, as long as both decrypt to the same plaintext.
Thus in this special case, this relaxation is no relaxation at all. This special
case arises in particular when an encryption scheme is unitary, meaning that
Enck(X) = VkXV
†
k for some collection {Vk}k of unitaries Vk ∈ U(HM ).
Theorem 3.8. For any unitary SKQES Π, Π is PNM iff Π is CiNM iff Π is
NM.
Proof. Since CiNM,NM ⇒ PNM for all SKQES, we only need to show the con-
verse direction. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a PNM unitary SKQES and ΛA an
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arbitrary attack on this scheme. By Theorem 3.6, we have, for some ε ≤ negl(n),
that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|M |2 − 1 (|M |2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ 3ε,
where
Λ1 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
Λ˜A(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
and
Λ2 = TrMM ′
[
(1MM
′ − φ+MM ′)Λ˜A(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
.
Let {VMk }k be the collection such that Enck(X) = VkXV †k and note that Enck;r =
Enck and C = M , where Enck;r is as in Theorem 2.3. Observe that
Λ1 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
E
k
[Deck(ΛA(Enck(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))))]
]
= TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
E
k
[
V †k (ΛA(Vk(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))V †k ))Vk
]]
= E
k
[
TrMM ′
[
Vkφ
+MM ′V †k (ΛA(Vk(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))V †k ))
]]
= E
k,r
[
TrCM ′
[
ψCM
′
k,r ΛA(ψ
CM ′
k,r ⊗ (·))
]]
,
where ψk,r = Vkφ
+MM ′V †k = Enck;r(φ
+MM ′). In the same way one can deduce
that Λ2 = E
k,r
[
TrCM ′
[
(1CM
′ − ψCM ′k,r )ΛA(ψCM
′
k,r ⊗ (·))
]]
, and thus Π is CiNM.
Similarly, we have
Λ1 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
E
k
[
V †k (ΛA(Vk(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))V †k ))Vk
]]
= TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
E
k
[
V †k (ΛA(V
TM ′
k (φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))V¯kM
′
))Vk
]]
= TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
E
k
[
(V †k ⊗ V TM
′
k )(ΛA(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·)))(Vk ⊗ V¯kM
′
)
]]
= E
k
[
TrMM ′
[
(Vk ⊗ V¯kM
′
)φ+MM
′
(V †k ⊗ V TM
′
k )(ΛA(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·)))
]]
= TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
(ΛA(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·)))
]
,
where we have used the “mirror lemma,” AM |φ〉+MM ′ = ATM ′ |φ〉+MM ′ in the
first and third equality, and (·)T is the transpose with respect to the computa-
tional basis and (¯·) is the complex conjugate. In the same way one can deduce
that
Λ2 = TrMM ′
[
(1− φ+MM ′)(ΛA(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·)))
]
and thus Π is NM. uunionsq
We can use this equivalence to adopt results proven for NM in [AM17], partic-
ularly that the unitaries in a unitary encryption scheme form a unitary 2-design.
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Definition 3.9. A family of unitary matrices D is an ε-approximate 2-design
if ∥∥∥∥∥ 1|D| ∑
U∈D
(U ⊗ U)(·)(U† ⊗ U†)−
∫
(U ⊗ U)(·)(U† ⊗ U†) dU
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
Corollary 3.10. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a unitary SKQES such that
Enck(ρ) = VkρV
†
k for some family of unitaries D = {Vk}k and |M | = |C| = 2n,
then Π being PNM or CiNM is equivalent to D to being an approximate 2-design,
in the sense that, for a sufficiently large constant r8,
1. If D is a Ω(2−rn)-approximate 2-design then Π is 2−Ω(n)-PNM and 2−Ω(n)-
CiNM.
2. If Π is Ω(2−rn)-PNM or Ω(2−rn)-CiNM, then D is a 2−Ω(n)-approximate
2-design.
To provide additional evidence that PNM captures plaintext non-malleability
for SKQES in a satisfactory way, we show that any PNM-secure scheme can be
used to construct a plaintext-authenticating scheme in the sense of [DNS12], see
Definition 2.6. The intuition behind DNS-authentication is that, after a possible
attack, one can determine from a received plaintext whether or not an attack
was performed, unless the attack did not change the underlying plaintext. For
this reason, DNS-authentication is a notion of plaintext authentication. We use
the fact that a PNM scheme protects a plaintext from modification to protect
a tag register, which we then use to detect whether an attack was attempted.
With this in mind, we first determine what state makes a good tag.
Lemma 3.11. For any SKQES (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) and any m ∈ N such that
M = M ′R for some registers M ′ and R with log |R| = m there exists an x ∈
{0, 1}m such that Tr[〈x|RDecK(τC)|x〉R] ≤ 1|R| .
Proof. Observe that
E
x∈{0,1}m
[Tr
[〈x|DecK(τC)|x〉]] = ∑
x∈{0,1}m
1
2m
Tr
[〈x|DecK(τC)|x〉]
=
1
2m
Tr
[
DecK(τ
C)
]
=
1
|R|
Since the expected value of Tr
[〈x|DecK(τC)|x〉] is 1|R| , there must be at least
one x such that Tr
[〈x|DecK(τC)|x〉] ≤ 1|R| . uunionsq
Lemma 3.11 allows us to find tags that have little overlap with DecK(τ
C),
which means one can distinguish well between the case were the tag was left un-
harmed and the case where the ciphertext was depolarized. We use this property
to build a scheme that is DNS authenticating.
8 For the exact value of r and the constants hidden by the Ω-s we refer to Theorem
C.3 in [AM17] and Lemma 2.2.14 in [Low10]
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Theorem 3.12. For any ε-PNM SKQES Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), there ex-
ists some x such that the scheme Π ′ = (KeyGen,Enc′,Dec′) is
(
3
|R| + ε
)
-DNS-
authenticating, where
Enc′k = Enck((·)M
′ ⊗ |x〉〈x|R)
Dec′k = 〈x|RDeck(·)|x〉R + Tr
[
(1R − |x〉〈x|R)Deck(·)
] |⊥〉〈⊥|
Proof. We sketch the proof here, the full proof of this theorem can be found in
Appendix A.3. Take x as in Lemma 3.11. Let ΛA be an arbitrary attack map on
Π ′, then its effective map is
Λ˜′A = Deccheck ◦ Λ˜A ◦ Encappend,
where Λ˜A is the effective map of ΛA as an attack on Π and Encappend and
Deccheck are the channels that perform adding |x〉〈x| to the plaintext during
encryption and removing and checking of |x〉〈x| during decryption respectively.
Since Π is ε-PNM, there exist Λ1, Λ2 such that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − id⊗Λ1 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ2
∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
Define Λacc = Λ1, Λrej = Λ2, then∥∥∥Λ˜′A − id⊗Λacc − 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥∥ ≤ ε+ 3|R| ,
which means that Π ′ is
(
3
|R| + ε
)
-DNS authenticating. uunionsq
Note that |R| is a parameter of the scheme and any PNM scheme (with
negligible ε) can be made into a DNS scheme (with negligible ε) by taking |R| =
2n, i.e. taking R as n qubits.
4 Non-Malleability for Quantum PKE
4.1 Quantum Comparison-Based Non-Malleability
In this section, we will define a notion of many-time non-malleability for quantum
public-key encryption, quantum comparison-based non-malleability (QCNM), as
a quantum analog of the classical notion of comparison-based non-malleability
(CNM, see Section 2) introduced in [BS99]. We first analyze CNM with the goal
of finding appropriate quantum analogs of each of its components.
The message distribution M in the CNM definition allows an adversary to
select messages that she thinks might produce ciphertexts that can be modified
in a structural way. This choice is given because the total plaintext space is expo-
nentially large, thus if one picks a message completely at random and only a few
of them can be modified into related ciphertexts, then the winning probability
is negligible despite the scheme being insecure. In the quantum representation
of this message space we consider the following requirements:
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1. As mentioned earlier, the quantum no-cloning theorem prevents copying the
plaintext after sampling it for future reference. In order to check the relation
in the last step of CNM, we require that two related states are produced, one
of which will be kept by the challenger and the other encrypted and used by
the adversary.
2. It must not be possible for the adversary to correlate herself with either of
the produced messages. This is to prevent the adversary from influencing the
second copy of the state later on. For example, consider the case where the
adversary produces the state 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉), where the first two qubits
are the two copies of the message and the last is kept by the adversary.
The adversary can then measure her qubit, collapsing the superposition and
informing her in which (classical) state the second copy now is. This allows
her to trivially construct a relation between her output and the second copy.
In order to satisfy requirement (1), we have chosen to represent M by a
unitary UMRP such that U |0〉 is a purification of the message distribution, where
the message resides in M , the second (reference) state in R, and P is used for the
purification9. This purification register allows the adversary to implement any
quantum channel on MR, with U being a Stinespring dilation of that channel.
The first part of the quantum adversary, A1, produces this unitary in the form
of a circuit along with some side information S to be passed on to the next stage.
We denote this process by (U, S)← A1(pk).
For the QCNM definition we define two experiments, similar to the CNM
definition. In the following we describe how the different elements of the CNM
experiment are instantiated in the quantum case. The appropriate quantum no-
tion of a relation R on plaintexts is given by a POVM element 0 ≤ EMR ≤ 1.
The two registers MR are considered to contain related states if an application of
the measurement {E,1−E} returns the outcome corresponding to E. Of course,
this POVM is provided by the adversary in form of a circuit and must hence be
efficient. The quantum analogue of the vector y is given by a collection of regis-
ters C = C1 . . . Cm, where m is at most polynomial in n, the security parameter
of the considered scheme, and each Ci satisfies MiTi = Ci ∼= C = MT . The
quantum analogue of the vector x is similarly given as M = M1 . . .Mm. Observe
that any PKQES can also be seen as a SKQES, with keys of the form k = (pk, sk),
which allows us to use Theorem 2.310. For any PKQES Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec)
with security parameter n, let {Vk | k = (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1n)}, t = log |T |,
{ψk,r | k = (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1n), r ∈ {0, 1}t} and {pk | k = (pk, sk) ←
KeyGen(1n)} be as in Theorem 2.3 in the QCNM experiments.
Lastly, we define the unitary Uprep combining the preparation of the message
state and the encryption of its part in register M . This means a check similar
to the y 6∈ y check in the CNM experiments can be implemented by sequentially
undoing Uprep on all combinations CiRP and then measuring whether the result
9 A purification is a quantum register that is similar to the “garbage” register in
reversible computation.
10 This characterization could also be invoked with k = pk, however the resulting
encryption unitary is then (likely) not efficiently implementable.
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is |0〉〈0|, which is only the case if Ci contained part of Uprep|0〉, which is the
original ciphertext given to the adversary.
We are now ready to define the real and ideal experiments for quantum
comparison-based non-malleability.
Experiment 3: QCNM-Real
Input : Π,A, n
Output: b ∈ {0, 1}
1 k = (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n)
2 (UMRP , S)← A1(pk)
3 r
pk←− {0, 1}t
4 Construct UTψ such that U
T
ψ |0〉T = |ψk,r〉T
5 Construct UMTRPprep = V
MT
k (U
MRP ⊗ UTψ )
6 Prepare Uprep|0〉〈0|U†prep in MTRP
7 (C, E)← A2(MT,S)
8 for i = 1, . . . , |C| do
9 Perform U†prep on CiRP
10 Measure {|0〉〈0|,1− |0〉〈0|} on CiRP with outcome b
11 if b = 0 then
12 Output 0
13 Perform Uprep on CiRP
14 M← Decsk(C)
15 {E,1− E} on RM with outcome e
16 Output e
Experiment 4: QCNM-Ideal
Input : Π,A, n
Output: b ∈ {0, 1}
1 Run lines 1-14 of Experiment QCNM-Real
15 Prepare U |0〉〈0|U† in M˜R˜P˜
16 {E,1− E} on R˜M with outcome e
17 Output e
A PKQES is now defined to be QCNM-secure, if no adversary can achieve
higher success probability in the experiment QCNM-Real than in QCNM-Ideal.
Definition 4.1. A PKQES Π is quantum comparison-based non-malleable
(QCNM) if for any QPT adversary A = (A1,A2) it holds that
Pr [QCNM-Real(Π,A, n) = 1]− Pr [QCNM-Ideal(Π,A, n) = 1] ≤ negl(n),
if A such that:
– A1 outputs a valid unitary U which can be implemented by a QPT algorithm,
– A2 outputs a POVM element E which can be implemented by a QPT algo-
rithm,
– A2 outputs a vector of registers C such that ⊥ 6∈ Decsk(C).
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4.2 Relation Between QCNM and CNM
In order to compare QCNM to CNM, we consider both definitions modified for
quantum adversaries and encryption schemes that have classical input and out-
put but can perform quantum computation. In the case that a quantum state is
sent to such a post-quantum algorithm, it is first measured in the computational
basis to obtain a classical input.
Experiment 5: QCNM-RealPQ
Input : Π,A, n
Output: b ∈ {0, 1}
1 k = (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n)
2 (UMRP , S)← A1(pk)
3 r
pk←− {0, 1}t
4 Construct UTψ such that U
T
ψ |0〉T = |ψk,r〉T
5 Construct UMTRPprep = V
MT
k (U
MRP ⊗ UTψ )
6 Prepare Uprep|0〉〈0|U†prep in MTRP
7 Measure MTR in the computational basis with outcome yMT zR
8 (C, E)← A2(MT,S)
9 for i = 1, . . . , |C| do
10 Measure {|y〉〈y|,1− |y〉〈y|} on Ci with outcome b
11 if b = y then
12 Output 0
13 M← Decsk(C)
14 {E,1− E} on RM with outcome e
15 Output e
Experiment 6: QCNM-IdealPQ
Input : Π,A, n
Output: b ∈ {0, 1}
1 Run lines 1-13 of Experiment QCNM-IdealPQ
14 Prepare U |0〉〈0|U† in M˜R˜P˜
15 Measure M˜R˜ in the computational basis
16 {E,1− E} on R˜M with outcome e
17 Output e
We consider the above experiments to be the post-quantum version of the
QCNM experiments. The main modification is the measurement in Step 7, which
enforces the requirement that A2 only takes classical input. The modification
of Steps 9 through 12 is made because the measurement in Step 7 disturbs
the state in an irreversible fashion, thus performing U†prep no longer inverts the
sampling/encryption process. Lastly, in the Ideal setting Step 15 is added to
mimic the effect that Step 7 would have on M ′.
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Definition 4.2. A PKQES Π is post-quantum comparison-based non-malleable
(QCNMPQ) if for any adversary A = (A1,A2) it holds that
Pr
[
QCNM-RealPQ(Π,A, n) = 1
]−Pr [QCNM-IdealPQ(Π,A, n) = 1] ≤ negl(n),
if A and Π are such that:
– A1 and A2 are QPT and output only classical states,
– A1 outputs a valid unitary U which can be implemented by a QPT algorithm,
– A2 outputs a POVM element E which implementable by a QPT algorithm,
and
– A2 outputs a vector of registers C such that ⊥ 6∈ Decsk(C).
Sampling of the message by the challenger is now done by not only applying
U to |0〉, but in addition also measuring in the computational basis. Similarly,
we define a post-quantum version of CNM.
Definition 4.3. A PKQES Π is comparison-based non-malleable against post-
quantum adversaries (CNMPQ) if for any QPT adversary A = (A1,A2) it holds
that
Pr [CNM-Real(Π,A, n) = 1]− Pr [CNM-Ideal(Π,A, n) = 1] ≤ negl(n),
if Π and A are such that:
– A1 and A2 are QPT and output classical strings,
– A1 outputs a valid QPT algorithm M which produces classical strings,
– A2 outputs a QPT algorithm R,
– A2 outputs a vector y such that ⊥ 6∈ Decsk(y).
The only difference between CNM and CNMPQ is that the latter allowsthe
encryption scheme, adversary and any algorithms produced by the adversary to
use a quantum computer. Furthermore, the relation R has become probabilistic,
but since it is used only once there is no difference between using a probabilistic
relation or picking a deterministic relation at random. Observe that CNMPQ
is simply a stronger requirement than CNM since it requires security against a
strict superset of adversaries, and thus trivially implies CNM.
Theorem 4.4. A PKQES Π is QCNMPQ if and only if Π is CNMPQ.
Proof. For the ⇒ direction, let Π be an arbitrary PKQES which is QCNMPQ-
secure and let A = (A1,A2) be an arbitrary quantum adversary intended to
perform the CNMPQ experiments. Assume that Π is such that Enc and Dec take
only classical input and produce only classical output. Define B = (B1,B2) as
follows:
B1(pk):
1 (M, s)← A1(pk)
2 Let pM (x) be the probability that x←M , then construct U such that
U |0〉MM ′P = 1|R|
∑
r∈R
|M(r)M(r)r〉 = ∑
x←M
√
pM (x)|xxφx〉MM ′P , where
M ′ ∼= M is the reference register, R is the set of possible input for M
and φx is the uniform superposition over all |r〉 such that x←M(r).
3 Output (U, |s〉〈s|)
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B2(|s〉〈s|S , |y〉〈y|MT ):
1 (R,y)← A2(y, s)
2 Construct E =
∑
i,j
R(i, j)|ij〉〈ij|
3 Output (E, |y〉〈y|C1...Cm)
Observe that the definition of QCNM-RealPQ(Π,B, n), after some simplifica-
tion, yields
1 k = (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n)
2 (M, s)← A1(pk)
3 Let pM (x) be the probability that x←M , then construct U such that
U |0〉MM ′P = ∑
x←M
√
pM (x)|xxφx〉MM ′P
4 r
pk←− {0, 1}t
5 Construct UTψ such that U
T
ψ |0〉T = |ψk,r〉T
6 Construct UMTM
′P
prep = V
MT
k (U
MM ′P ⊗ UTψ )
7 Prepare Uprep|0〉〈0|U†prep in MTM ′P
8 Measure MTM ′ in the computational basis with outcome yz
9 (R,y)← A2(y, s)
10 Construct E =
∑
i,j
R(i, j)|ij〉〈ij|
11 Prepare |y〉〈y| in C
12 for i = 1, . . . , |C| do
13 Measure {|y〉〈y|,1− |y〉〈y|} on Ci with outcome b
14 if b = y then
15 Output 0
16 M← Decsk(C)
17 {E,1− E} on M ′M with outcome e
18 Output e
Here Steps 3,5,6,7 and 8 together simply execute x ← M ; y ← Enck;r(x).
Furthermore, if y ∈ y then some Ci contains |y〉〈y|, which will guarantee the
output to be y in Step 13. Conversely if y 6∈ y, then all Ci contain some state
orthogonal to |y〉〈y| and thus Step 13 has 0 probability of outputting y in this
case, thus Step 13 effectively implements the y 6∈ y check. Lastly, note that E
is a projective measurement which projects onto the space spanned by all |ij〉
such that R(i, j), which means that Step 17 outputs 1 iff R(x,x), where x is
stored in M ′ and x in M. We conclude that QCNM-RealPQ(Π,B, n) produces
the same random variable as CNM-Real(Π,A, n). By similar reasoning the same
is true for the Ideal case, with the additional observation that preparing U |0〉 in
M˜M˜ ′P˜ and measuring M˜ in the computational basis with result x˜ is equivalent
to x˜←M and collapses M˜ ′ to x˜. It follows that Π is CNMPQ.
For the ⇐ direction, let Π be an arbitrary PKQES fulfilling CNMPQ and
let A = (A1,A2) be an arbitrary classical adversary on this scheme intended to
perform the QCNMPQ experiments. Define B = (B1,B2) as follows:
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B1(pk):
1 (U, |s〉〈s|S)← A1(pk)
2 Prepare U |0〉 twice, in M0R0P0 and M1R1P1
3 Measure M0R0M1R1 in the computational basis with outcome m0z0m1z1
4 Construct M to be the uniform distribution over {m0,m1}
5 Output (M, sm0z0m1z1)
B2(s′, y):
1 Parse s′ as sm0z0m1z1
2 (E,y)← A2(|s〉〈s|S , |y〉〈y|MT )
3 Construct R(x,x) to be
4 Find i such that mi = x
5 prepare |zix〉〈zix| in R′M
6 measure {E,1− E} on R′M, output 1 iff the outcome is E
7 Output (R, |y〉〈y|)
Observe that the definition of CNM-RealPQ(Π,B, n), after some simplifica-
tion, yields
1 k = (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n)
2 (U, |s〉〈s|S)← A1(pk)
3 Prepare U |0〉 in M0R0P0
4 Prepare U |0〉 in M1R1P1
5 Measure M0R0M1R1 in the computational basis with outcome m0z0m1z1
6 Pick i← {0, 1}
7 y ← Encpk(mi)
8 (E, |y〉〈y|)← A2(|s〉〈s|S , |y〉〈y|MT )
9 x← Decsk(y)
10 if y ∈ y then
11 Output 0
12 Find j such that mj = mi
13 Prepare |zjx〉〈zjx| in RM
14 {E,1− E} on RM with outcome e
15 Output e
Similarly, the CNM-IdealPQ(Π,B, n) yields the same Experiment except with
line 12 replaced with “Pick j ← {0, 1}”. Note that Step 7, the encrypting, is
not performed by Uprep but simply by Enc and that Step 10 simply checks
y ∈ y instead of loop that we earlier argued to be equivalent. Additionally the
measurement in Step 3 and 4 are equivalent to measuring the ciphertext after
encryption (as is done in QCNM), because it is assumed that encryption, and
thus Vk, maps classical states to classical states.
Note that w.l.o.g. we can assume that m0 6= m1, since if this is not the case
then the Real and Ideal case are equivalent and thus the adversary has no hope of
winning. This makes that the CNM-RealPQ(Π,B, n) and QCNM-RealPQ(Π,A, n)
are equivalent given the observations in the previous paragraph. Furthermore,
24
when i = j in the CNM-Ideal case then it is equivalent to the CNM-Real case.
When i 6= j, the CNM-IdealPQ(Π,B, n) and QCNM-IdealPQ(Π,A, n) experiments
are equivalent. Thus the advantage of B in CNM is half the advantage of A in
QCNM, which implies that Π is QCNMPQ. uunionsq
Note that we argued earlier that, for any PKES, being CNMPQ trivially im-
plies being CNM, thus we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5. Any QCNMPQ PKES is CNM.
4.3 A QCNM Secure Scheme
In this section we show how QCNM-security can be achieved using a quantum-
classical hybrid construction like the ones used in [AGM18b; AGM18a]. The
idea is similar to the classical technique of hybrid encryption. We construct
a quantum-non-malleable PKQES by encrypting each plaintext with a quan-
tum one-time non-malleable scheme and encrypting the key using a classical
non-malleable PKES. We begin by defining the general quantum-classical hybrid
construction.
Construction 1 Let ΠQu = (KeyGenQu,EncQu,DecQu) be a SKQES and ΠCl =
(KeyGenCl,EncCl,DecCl) a PKES. We define the hybrid scheme ΠHyb[ΠQu, ΠCl] =
(KeyGenHyb,EncHybDecHyb) as follows. We set KeyGenHyb = KeyGenCl. The en-
cryption algorithm EncHybpk , on input X,
1. generates a key k ← KeyGenQu(1n(pk)), and
2. outputs the pair (EncQuk (X),Enc
Cl
pk(k)).
Decryption is done in the obvious way, by first decrypting the second part of the
ciphertext using DecCl to obtain the one-time key k′, and then decrypting the
first part using DecQuk′ .
We continue by proving that if ΠQu is unitary and secure according to NM,
CiNM or PNM (they are all equivalent for unitary SKQES according to Theorem
3.8), and ΠCl to be CNM, then ΠHyb[ΠQu, ΠCl] is QCNM.
Theorem 4.6. Let ΠQu = (KeyGenQu,EncQu,DecQu) be a NM secure SKQES
with unitary encryption and decryption map, and ΠCl = (KeyGenCl,EncCl,DecCl)
a postquantum-CNM secure PKES. Then ΠHyb[ΠQu, ΠCl] is QCNM.
Proof. We begin by defining modified versions of the two experiments used in
defining QCNM, sckQCNM-Real and sckQCNM-Ideal (for spoofed classical key).
These two experiments are defined exactly as the experiments QCNM-Real and
QCNM-Ideal, except for the following modifications:
1. When creating the ciphertext register C that is handed to the adversary, its
classical part c is produced by encrypting a fresh, independently sampled
one-time key k′ ← KeyGenQu. The pair (c, k) is stored (k being the key used
for encryption with EncQu.)
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2. The test whether the ciphertext was modified by the adversary is done by
first checking whether the classical part c′ is equal to c. If it is not, the
ciphertext was modified and no further test of the quantum part is necessary.
If c′ = c, the modification check from the games QCNM-Real and QCNM-Ideal
is applied, using the stored one-time key k. Note that this is equivalent to
the check mandated for the QCNM experiments.
3. Before decrypting any ciphertext, the challenger checks whether its classical
part is equal to c. If not, he proceeds with decryption, otherwise, he just
decrypts the quantum ciphertext with DecQuk .
Let A be a QCNM-adversary against ΠHyb. Recall that it was proven in
[BS99] that CNM is equivalent to IND-parCCA2, indistinguishability under par-
allel chosen ciphertext attacks. In this attack model, after receiving the chal-
lenge ciphertext, the adversary is allowed to submit one tuple of ciphertexts
that is decrypted in case none of them is equal to the challenge ciphertext.
Define the following IND-parCCA2 adversary A′ against ΠCl. A′ simulates the
QCNM-Real(ΠHyb,A, n)-experiment. When the QCNM-Real challenger is sup-
posed to encrypt a plaintext to be sent to A, A′ sends m0 = k and m1 = k′
as challenge plaintexts to the IND-parCCA2 challenger, where k, k′ ← KeyGenQu,
and k is used to encrypt the quantum plaintext. After storing a copy of the
resulting classical ciphertext c and the one-time key k, A′ continues to simu-
late QCNM-Real(ΠHyb,A, n) but using the mixed quantum-classical modification
check from the spoofed classical key experiments defined above. Decryption is
done using the parCCA2 oracle, except for the ciphertexts with classical part c,
which are just decrypted using the stored one-time key k. Now A′ outputs the
result of the simulated experiment QCNM-Real(ΠHyb,A, n).
Now observe that if the IND-parCCA2 challenger’s bit comes up b = 0,
A′ faithfully simulated the experiment QCNM-Real(ΠHyb,A, n), while the case
b = 1 results in a simulation of sckQCNM-Real(ΠHyb,A, n). Therefore, the
IND-parCCA2 security ofΠCl implies that the games QCNM-Real and sckQCNM-Real
have the same result, up to negligible difference.
We can also define an IND-parCCA2 adversaryA′′ againstΠCl in the same way
as A′, but this time using the QCNM-Ideal experiments. This implies analogously
that the experiments QCNM-Ideal and sckQCNM-Ideal also have the same result,
up to negligible difference.
Finally, what is left to prove is that the experiments sckQCNM-Real and
sckQCNM-Ideal have the same outcome due to the NM security of ΠQu. If the
classical part of the ciphertext has been modified, Deck is never applied. By
the fact that the scheme ΠQu is IND secure [AM17], M is independent of (i.e.
in a product state with) R, i.e. MR and MR˜ have the same state. Therefore,
sckQCNM-Real and sckQCNM-Ideal have the same outcome. For the remaining
case of c′ = c, note that the modification test in lines 8 through 13 of Experiments
3 and 4 are identical, and that the application of
(
VM
)†
(T is trivial for unitary
encryption) is equal to decryption. We can hence decrypt all ciphertexts before
the modification test in the experiments sckQCNM-Real and sckQCNM-Ideal (line
9 in experiments QCNM-Real and QCNM-Ideal), and replace Uprep by U . It follows
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that the rest of the experiment after decryption does not depend on the one-
time key k anymore. Hence the experiment has the form of a multi-decryption
attack on the scheme ΠQu, i.e. where one ciphertext (the one that A2 receives
as input) is mapped to many ciphertexts (the ones in C) and are subsequently
decrypted. We can therefore apply Lemma A.4 to conclude that the modification
test outputs 0 unless M is in product withR, in which case MR and MR˜ have the
same state. sckQCNM-Real and sckQCNM-Ideal therefore have the same outcome.
uunionsq
5 Open Questions
After providing the first definition of non-malleability for quantum public-key
encryption and showing how to fulfill it, and providing a comprehensive taxon-
omy of one-time security notions in the symmetric-key case, our work leaves a
number of interesting open questions.
First, one might wonder what other connections PNM and CiNM have to
other established security notions, such as the suggestion made in [AM17] that
NM, CiNM or PNM might be used to construct a totally authenticating scheme
as defined in [GYZ17].
Second, many interesting problems remain in the computational setting.
While our proposed definition of QCNM provides a natural extension of CNM
to the quantum setting, a number of alternative but equivalent definitions of
classical non-malleability exist, such as simulation-based non-malleability as de-
fined in [BS99]. Besides the natural question whether QCNM truly captures
non-malleability, one might want to consider quantum versions of other classi-
cal notions of non-malleability and the relations between them. Furthermore,
a symmetric-key version of QCNM could be explored, which we conjecture to
be distinct from a computational version of CiNM due to the mismatch of the
way side information is handled (the S register in QCNM and the B register in
CiNM).
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A Proofs
Lemma A.1 (Lemma 3.4). Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an arbitrary
SKQES and ΛCB→CBˆA an arbitrary attack on Π with effective map Λ˜
MB→MBˆ
A .
If there exist CPTNI Λ1, Λ2, such that Λ1 + Λ2 is CPTP and it holds that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε,
then for any α such that |M |2 ≤ α ≤ |C|2 there exist CPTNI Λ3, Λ4 such that
Λ3 + Λ4 is CPTP and∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ3 + 1α− 1 (α〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ4
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
Proof. Assume that for some CPTNI Λ1, Λ2 such that Λ1 +Λ2 is CPTP it holds
that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
Define γ = (α−1)|C|
2
α(|C|2−1) , Λ3 = Λ1 + (1 − γ)Λ2, and Λ4 = γΛ2. Note that
0 < γ ≤ 1 as long as 1 < α ≤ |C|2 and thus Λ3 and Λ4 are CPTNI. Furthermore
Λ3 + Λ4 = Λ1 + Λ2, thus Λ3 + Λ4 is CPTP. Observe that
idM ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ3 +
1
α− 1
(
α〈DecK(τC)〉 − id
)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ4
= idM ⊗ (Λ1 + (1− γ)Λ2) + 1
α− 1(α〈DecK(τ
C)〉 − id)M ⊗ γΛ2
= idM ⊗Λ1 + (1− γ) idM ⊗Λ2 + γ
α− 1(α〈DecK(τ
C)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ2
= idM ⊗Λ1 + |C|
2
|C|2 − 1 〈DecK(τ)〉 ⊗ Λ2 −
1
|C|2 − 1 id
M ⊗Λ2
= idM ⊗Λ1 + 1|C|2 − 1(|C|
2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ2.
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From this it follows that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ3 + 1α− 1 (α〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ4
)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
uunionsq
Theorem A.2 (Theorem 3.6). Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an arbitrary
ε-PNM SKQES for some ε, then for any attack ΛCB→CBˆA , its effective map
Λ˜MB→MBˆA is such that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − (idM ⊗ΛB→Bˆ1 + 1|M |2 − 1 (|M |2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ ΛB→Bˆ2
)∥∥∥∥

≤ 3ε,
where
Λ1 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
Λ˜A(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
and
Λ2 = TrMM ′
[
(1MM
′ − φ+MM ′)Λ˜A(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
.
Proof. LetΠ = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an arbitrary ε-PNM SKQES for some ε and
let ΛCB→CBˆA be an arbitrary attack with effective map Λ˜
MB→MBˆ
A . Furthermore,
let ΛB→Bˆ1 and Λ
B→Bˆ
2 be such that∥∥∥Λ˜A − Λ˜ideal∥∥∥ ≤ ε,
where Λ˜MB→MBˆideal = id
M ⊗Λ1 + 1|M |2−1 (|M |2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ2. Lastly, let
Λ3 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
Λ˜A(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
,
Λ4 = TrMM ′
[
(1MM
′ − φ+MM ′)Λ˜A(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
, and
Λ˜MB→MBˆtrace = id
M ⊗Λ3 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |
2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ4 .
Observe that, by the triangle inequality,
∥∥∥Λ˜− Λ˜trace∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Λ˜− Λ˜ideal∥∥∥ +∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − Λ˜trace∥∥∥. Furthermore,∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − Λ˜trace∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥idM ⊗(Λ1 − Λ3) + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)M ⊗ (Λ2 − Λ4)
∥∥∥∥

≤
∥∥∥idM ⊗(Λ1 − Λ3)∥∥∥ +
∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)M ⊗ (Λ2 − Λ4)
∥∥∥∥

= ‖id‖ ‖(Λ1 − Λ3)‖ +
∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)M
∥∥∥∥

‖(Λ2 − Λ4)‖
≤ ‖(Λ1 − Λ3)‖ + ‖(Λ2 − Λ4)‖
31
Let Λ5 = TrMM ′
[
φ+MM
′
Λ˜ideal(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
and
Λ6 = TrMM ′
[
(1MM
′ − φ+MM ′)Λ˜ideal(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
. Observe that the map-
ping
ρ 7→ |0〉〈0| ⊗ TrMM ′ [φ+MM ′ρ] + |1〉〈1| ⊗ TrMM ′ [(1MM ′ − φ+MM ′)ρ]
is CPTP. Since
∥∥∥(Λ˜− Λ˜ideal)(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Λ˜− Λ˜ideal∥∥∥ ≤ ε and the dia-
mond norm is non-increasing under CPTP maps11, we have
‖|0〉〈0| ⊗ (Λ3 − Λ5) + |1〉〈1| ⊗ (Λ4 − Λ6)‖ ≤ ε and thus ‖Λ3 − Λ5‖ ≤ ε and
‖Λ4 − Λ6‖ ≤ ε. Using this we observe that∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − Λ˜trace∥∥∥ ≤ ‖Λ1 − Λ3‖ + ‖Λ2 − Λ4‖
≤ ‖Λ1 − Λ5‖ + ‖Λ5 − Λ3‖ + ‖Λ2 − Λ6‖ + ‖Λ6 − Λ4‖
≤ 2ε+ ‖Λ1 − Λ5‖ + ‖Λ2 − Λ6‖ .
Furthermore we have
Λ5 = TrMM ′ [φ
+Λ˜ideal(φ
+ ⊗ (·))]
= TrMM ′
[
φ+
(
φ+ ⊗ Λ1 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |
2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)(φ+)⊗ Λ2
)]
= TrMM ′
[
φ+
(
φ+ ⊗ Λ1 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |
2DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′ − φ+)⊗ Λ2
)]
= Λ1 + Tr
[
1
|M |2 − 1(|M |
2φ+(DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′)− φ+)
]
Λ2
= Λ1,
where φ+ = φ+MM
′
and the last equality holds because
Tr
[
φ+MM
′
(DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′)
]
=
1
|M | Tr
 |M |∑
i,j=0
|ii〉〈jj|(DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′)

=
1
|M | Tr
 |M |∑
i,j=0
|i〉〈j|DecK(τ)⊗ |i〉〈j|τM ′)

=
1
|M |2 Tr
|M |∑
i=0
|i〉〈i|DecK(τ)

=
1
|M |2
11 See [Wat18], Proposition 3.48(1)
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Similarly
Λ6 = TrMM ′
[
(IMM
′ − φ+MM ′)Λ˜ideal(φ+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
= TrMM ′
[
Λ˜ideal(φ
+MM ′ ⊗ (·))
]
− Λ5
= TrMM ′
[(
φ+ ⊗ Λ1 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |
2DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′ − φ+)⊗ Λ2
)]
= Λ1 + Λ2 − Λ5
= Λ2.
From this we conclude∥∥∥Λ˜− Λ˜trace∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Λ˜− Λ˜ideal∥∥∥ + ∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − Λ˜trace∥∥∥
≤ ε+
∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − Λ˜trace∥∥∥
≤ 3ε+ ‖Λ1 − Λ5‖ + ‖Λ2 − Λ6‖
= 3ε.
uunionsq
Theorem A.3 (Theorem 3.12). For any 0 ≤ ε ≤ 2 and any ε-PNM SKQES
Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), there exists some x such that the scheme
Π ′ = (KeyGen,Enc′,Dec′) is
(
3
|R| + ε
)
-DNS-authenticating, where
Enc′k = Enck((·)M
′ ⊗ |x〉〈x|R)
Dec′k = 〈x|RDeck(·)|x〉R + Tr
[
(1R − |x〉〈x|R)Deck(·)
] |⊥〉〈⊥|
Proof. By Lemma 3.11, there exists an x ∈ {0, 1}log |R| such that
Tr
[〈x|DecK(τC)|x〉] ≤ 1|R| . Fix this x and defineΠ ′ as above. Define Encap(X) =
X⊗|x〉〈x| and Decch(Y ) = 〈x|Y |x〉+ Tr [(1− |x〉〈x|)Y ] |⊥〉〈⊥| and observe that
Enc′ = Enc ◦ Encap and Dec′ = Decch ◦ Dec. Let ΛA be an arbitrary attack map
on Π ′, then its effective map is
Λ˜′A = E
k←KeyGen(1n)
[Dec′k ◦ ΛA ◦ Enc′k].
Since Encap and Decch do not change with k and are linear, we have
Λ˜′A = Decch ◦ Λ˜A ◦ Encap,
where Λ˜A = E
k←KeyGen(1n)
[(Deck ◦ ΛA ◦ Enck)]. Since Π is ε-PNM, there exist
Λ1, Λ2 such that∥∥∥∥Λ˜A − id⊗Λ1 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ2
∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
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Since Encap and Decch are both CPTP, by submultiplicativity we have that∥∥∥∥Decch ◦ (Λ˜A − id⊗Λ1 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)⊗ Λ2
)
◦ Encap
∥∥∥∥

≤ ε,
which is equivalent to∥∥∥∥Λ˜′A − Decch ◦ (id⊗Λ1 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈DecK(τ)〉 − id)⊗ Λ2
)
◦ Encap
∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
Observe that
Decch◦id ◦Encap = 〈x|((·)⊗|x〉〈x|)|x〉+Tr[(1−|x〉〈x|)((·)⊗|x〉〈x|)]|⊥〉〈⊥| = id .
Define Λacc = Λ1, Λrej = Λ2 and
Λ˜ideal = Decch ◦
(
id⊗Λ1 + 1|M |2 − 1(|M |
2〈DecK(τC)〉 − id)M ⊗ Λ2
)
◦Encap,
then we have∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − id⊗Λacc − 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥( 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2(Decch ◦ 〈DecK(τ)〉 ◦ Encap)− id)− 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉
)
⊗ Λ2
∥∥∥∥

≤
∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2(Decch ◦ Tr [(·)M ′]DecK(τ))− id)− 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉
∥∥∥∥

Here the inequality uses the fact that Encap is trace preserving and 〈DecK(τ)〉
is a constant channel, which only uses the trace of the input. Since every term
ended in ⊗Λ2, we removed this term and multiplied with ‖Λ2‖, which is less
than 1 since Λ2 is CPTNI. We continue by expanding Decch, where we use
that 〈x|Tr
[
(·)M ′
]
DecK(τ
C)|x〉 = 〈〈x|DecK(τC)|x〉〉 and we abbreviate ψ =
〈x|DecK(τC)|x〉 and [⊥] = 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉.∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2(Decch ◦ Tr [(·)M ′]DecK(τC))− id)− [⊥]
∥∥∥∥

=
∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2 (〈ψ〉+ Tr[(1− |x〉〈x|)DecK(τC)][⊥])− id)− [⊥]
∥∥∥∥

.
We can rewrite this expression by first rewriting Tr[(1 − |x〉〈x|)DecK(τC)] as
1− Tr[ψ], then collecting all multipliers of 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉, and lastly distributing the
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|M |2 term and simplifying the resulting term.∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2 (〈ψ〉+ (1− Tr[ψ])〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉)− id)− 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉
∥∥∥∥

=
∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2
(
〈ψ〉+
(
(1− Tr[ψ])− |M |
2 − 1
|M |2
)
〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉
)
− id)
∥∥∥∥

=
∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈ψ〉+ (|M |2(1− Tr[ψ])− (|M |2 − 1)) 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 − id)
∥∥∥∥

=
∥∥∥∥ 1|M |2 − 1(|M |2〈ψ〉+ (1− |M |2 Tr[ψ])) 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 − id)
∥∥∥∥

≤ 1|M |2 − 1
(|M |2 ‖〈ψ〉‖ + ∥∥(1− |M |2 Tr[ψ])〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉∥∥ + ‖id‖)
≤ 1|M |2 − 1
( |M |2
|R| +
( |M |2
|R| − 1
)
+ 1
)
≤ 3|R| .
Here the first inequality is an application of the triangle inequality. The
second inequality uses the fact that ‖id‖ = ‖〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉‖ = 1 and that |R|〈ψ〉 is
CPTNI because Tr
[〈x|DecK(τC)|x〉] ≤ 1|R| and thus ‖〈ψ〉‖ ≤ 1|R| .
Since
∥∥∥Λ˜′A − Λ˜ideal∥∥∥ ≤ ε and ∥∥∥Λ˜ideal − id⊗Λacc − 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥∥ ≤ 3|R| ,
we have by the triangle inequality that∥∥∥Λ˜′A − id⊗Λacc − 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥∥ ≤ ε+ 3|R| ,
which means that Π ′ is
(
3
|R| + ε
)
-DNS authenticating. uunionsq
To prove QCNM security of the classical-quantum hybrid scheme, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma A.4. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a SKQES, let ` ∈ N, let C =
C1 . . . C` ∼= C` and M = M1 . . .M` ∼= M ` be vectors of registers, let ΛC→C be a
CPTP map, and set
Λ˜M→M = E
k←KeyGen(1n)
[
(Deck)
⊗` ◦ Λ ◦ Enck
]
.
If SKQES is CiNM secure, then for some p0 and {σi}i we have that
Λ˜M→M =
∑`
i=1
pi id
M→Mi ⊗σM−ii + p0〈σM0 〉,
where qi is the probability that is equal to Λ1 from Definition 3.2 applied to
the attack map TrC−i ◦Λ and M−i = M1 . . .Mi−1Mi+1 . . .M` and pi = qi −
1
|C|2−1 (1− qi).
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Proof. For fixed i, consider the attack Λ′ = TrC−i ◦Λ on Π and observe that its
effective map satisfies Λ˜′ = Ek
[
Deck ◦ TrC−i ◦Λ ◦ Enck
]
= TrM−i ◦Λ˜. Because
Π is CiNM, we have Λ˜′ = pi id +(1− pi)〈DecK(τ)〉 and thus
TrM−i ◦Λ˜(φ+MM
′
) = piφ
+MiM
′
+ (1− pi)DecK(τ)⊗ τM ′ . (1)
Consider the state Λ˜(φ+MM
′
). Because φ+MiM
′
is a pure state, we know that
Λ˜(φ+MM
′
) is a convex combination of terms of the form piφ
+MiM
′ ⊗ σM−i and
a term p0σ
M
0 ⊗ τM
′
, i.e.
Λ˜(φ+MM
′
) =
∑`
i=1
piφ
+MiM
′ ⊗ σM−ii + p0σM0 ⊗ τM
′
. (2)
By the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism[Jam72; Cho75] this means that
Λ˜M→M =
∑`
i=1
pi id
M→Mi ⊗σM−ii + p0〈σM0 〉.
Using Equation (1), we get in addition that all single-system marginals of σi,
i = 0, ..., ` are equal to DecK(τ). uunionsq
Note that a similar statement can be proven for attack maps ΛMB→MB˜ with
side information, but we only need the above statement in Theorem 4.6.
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